INTRODUCING “SUNSET CLAUSES” (TEMPORARY LEGAL PROVISIONS) INTO NORMATIVE LEGAL ACTS: A TOOL FOR LIMITING EXCESSIVE REGULATION

Abstract

This article analyzes the theoretical and practical aspects of introducing the “sunset clause” institution into normative legal acts. The study examines the legal nature of sunset clauses, their role in limiting excessive regulation, as well as their advantages, disadvantages, and significance within modern regulatory policy. The experiences of the United States, South Korea, Germany, and Canada, together with the approaches of OECD and World Bank, are comparatively reviewed. The article substantiates the relationship between sunset clauses and ex-post evaluation, regulatory impact assessment (RIA), and evidence-based regulation mechanisms. The study concludes that sunset clauses should not be considered a universal instrument for all legal regulations; however, they may serve as an effective mechanism for experimental regulations, new licensing requirements, tax incentives, and business-burdening regulations. The article also proposes practical recommendations for the gradual implementation of the sunset clause institution into the legal system of Uzbekistan.